The selection effect of two-way trade in the Melitz model: an alternative approach by Potin, Jacques
The selection effect of two-way trade in the Melitz
model: an alternative approach
Jacques Potin
To cite this version:
Jacques Potin. The selection effect of two-way trade in the Melitz model: an alternative
approach. ESSEC Working paper. Document de Recherche ESSEC / Centre de recherche de
l’ESSEC ISSN : 1291-961.. 2009. <hal-00554724>
HAL Id: hal-00554724
https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00554724
Submitted on 11 Jan 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
THE SELECTION EFFECT OF TWO-WAY TRADE
IN THE MELITZ MODEL: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
JACQUES POTIN
©
 E
SS
EC
/C
TD
 - 
Ce
nt
re
 d
e 
Re
ch
er
ch
e/
11
05
09
14
15
GROUPE ESSEC
centre de recherche/RESEARCH CENTER
AVENUE BERNARD HIRSCH
BP 50105 CERGY
95021 CERGY-PONTOISE CEDEX
FRANCE
TéL. +33 (0)1 34 43 30 91
FAX +33 (0)1 34 43 30 01
research.center@essec.fr
essec business school paris-singapore.
établissements privés d’enseignement supérieur,
association loi 1901,
accréditéS aacsb international - the association
TO ADVANCE COLLEGIATE SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS,
accrédités EQUIS - the european quality improvement system,
affiliés à la chambre de commerce et d’industrie
de versailles val d’oise - yvelines.
Pour tous renseignements :
• Centre de Recherche/Research Center
Tél. +33 (0)1 34 43 30 91
research.center@essec.fr
• Visitez notre site
www.essec.fr
D
R
 0
90
0
1
April 2009
 
Il est interdit de reproduire ce document ou d'en citer des extraits  
sans l'autorisation écrite des auteurs.  
It is forbidden to quote all or part of this document without the written consent of the authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- DR 09001 - 
 
 
THE SELECTION EFFECT OF TWO-WAY TRADE IN THE MELITZ MODEL: 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
 
Jacques POTIN* 
 
 
April 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  ESSEC Business School,  Department of Economics, Avenue Bernard Hirsch, BP 50105, 95021 Cergy Pontoise Cedex, 
France, tel: (33) 1-3443-3089, fax: (33) 1-3443-3001. E-mail : potin @essec.fr 
 
THE SELECTION EFFECT OF TWO-WAY TRADE IN THE MELITZ MODEL: 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Jacques Potin 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  
 
This paper studies the influential Melitz model of trade with heterogeneous firms using an alternative, intuitive 
approach. Contrary to what is often argued, it is an increase in product market competition that drives the bad 
firms out: with two-way trade, entry by foreign firms is not compensated by a “sufficient” reduction in the mass 
of surviving firms. To illustrate this, we decompose the total effect of trade in two partial effects: a domestic-
profit-reducing effect due to foreign market penetration by the most productive firms; an average-profit-
reducing effect due to the payment of the fixed export costs. We also provide the new prediction that trade 
generally leads to (weakly) less entry in the industry. This 
clarifies key interpretation issues in a prolific literature. 
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RESUME :  
 
Ce papier propose une approche intuitive du très influent modèle de commerce international avec firmes 
hétérogènes proposé par Melitz. Contrairement à ce qui est souvent écrit, c’est une concurrence accrue sur le 
marché des produits qui fait sortir les firmes les moins productives : avec commerce bilatéral, l’entrée par les 
firmes étrangères n’est pas compensée par une réduction  “suffisante” de la masse de firmes qui survivent. Afin 
d’illustrer ce phénomène, nous décomposons l’effet total du commerce en deux effets partiels : un effet 
“réduction du profit domestique” dû à l’entrée des firmes les plus productives sur les marchés étrangers ; un 
effet “réduction du profit moyen” dû au paiement des coûts fixes d’exportation. Nous prouvons également 
qu’une ouverture du commerce amène à moins d’entrée dans l’industrie. Nos résultats clarifient des points 
importants dans une littérature en plein développement. 
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Abstract
This paper studies the influential Melitz model of trade with heterogeneous
firms using an alternative, intuitive approach. Contrary to what is often ar-
gued, it is an increase in product market competition that drives the bad
firms out: with two-way trade, entry by foreign firms is not compensated by
a “sufficient” reduction in the mass of surviving firms. To illustrate this, we
decompose the total effect of trade in two partial effects: a domestic-profit-
reducing effect due to foreign market penetration by the most productive
firms; an average-profit-reducing effect due to the payment of the fixed ex-
port costs. We also provide the new prediction that trade generally leads to
(weakly) less entry in the industry. This clarifies key interpretation issues in
a prolific literature.
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1 Introduction
The paper by Melitz (2003) is one of the most influential in the recent trade litera-
ture. He extends the Krugman (1980) model by introducing productivity differences
across firms. Only the firms with a productivity level above an endogenously deter-
mined cutoff can survive. This cutoff tends to increase when the countries open up
to two-way trade: this is the first selection effect of trade. In the model, only the
firms that are sufficiently productive decide to enter the foreign markets: this is the
second selection effect of trade. Melitz (2003) shows that, through these selection
effects, trade leads to aggregate productivity gains that raise welfare. The impor-
tance of the seminal work is an invitation to provide more intuition about what
drives the main results.
In its first contribution, this paper explains the (first) selection effect of trade
with an approach that is arguably more intuitive than Melitz’s. While the original
approach has become standard, it shows why the low productivity firms have to
be driven out the industry, but it does not show explicitly how the bad firms are
driven out of the industry. Instead, we explain intuitively and illustrate graphically
the selection effect of trade. This leads us to significantly qualify the explanation
provided by Melitz (2003, Section 7.2).
Our starting point is simple. With C.E.S. preferences and monopolistic compe-
tition, the mark-ups remain unchanged after the opening to trade.1 Thus, as the
low productivity firms only sell on their domestic market, their profits change if and
1See Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) for a model where trade has an impact on the “toughness”
of competition, i.e. on the mark-ups.
1
only if they sell lower volumes on that market, which happens if the domestic ideal
price index goes down. Thus trade drives the bad firms out if and only if entry by
foreign firms is not compensated by a sufficient decrease in the number of producers.
This point is implicit in the existing literature. Here we make it explicit and, more
importantly and originally, we show and illustrate the exact mechanism at play.2
As highlighted by Melitz (2003, Section 5), the fixed export costs are crucial in
his model. The present paper shows that it is fruitful to disentangle the total impact
of these costs. First, they generate self-selection into export markets. Second, they
reduce the profits of the exporters. Each of these partial impacts affects one of two
equilibrium conditions involving the productivity cutoff for survival, ϕ∗, and the
mass of surviving firms, M . The first of these conditions is the free-entry (FE)
condition: it states that the net value of entry should be equal to zero. The second
condition is the zero-profit (ZP ) condition: it states that the active firms with the
lowest productivity should just break even.
First, self-selection into export markets has a domestic-profit-reducing effect that
affects only the (ZP ) condition: entry by foreign firms reduces each firm’s domestic
profit and the total profit of each low productivity firm (because such a firm chooses
not to export). For the productivity cutoff for survival, ϕ∗, to remain unchanged,
a sufficient decrease in M is required; or, alternatively, for any given M , a corre-
sponding increase in ϕ∗ is required. When we ignore the impact of the fixed export
costs on the exporters profits, we find that foreign market entry by the most pro-
2Since Melitz (2002), it is also well understood that moving from autarky to a situation with
imports only would have no impact on the productivity cutoff. The export opportunities are
therefore crucial. But our focus here is on the total effect of two-way trade.
2
ductive firms has no effect on the average profit (for any M), and thus no effect on
the (FE) condition: the variable profits made on the foreign markets just compen-
sate the losses on the domestic markets. Letting ϕ∗ and M vary, we find that this
domestic-profit-reducing effect induces an increase in ϕ∗ and a decrease in M .
Second, the fixed export costs reduce the profits of the exporters, thus the average
profit made by the active firms. The (FE) condition is modified by this average-
profit-reducing effect. On the other hand, the (ZP ) condition is unchanged because
it is specific to firms that decide not to export. This change in the (FE) condition
induces an additional decrease in M and mitigates the increase in ϕ∗: as proved
by Melitz (2003), moving from autarky to two-way trade induces exit by the least
productive firms.
In a second contribution, we provide the new prediction that, under specific
conditions, moving from autarky to two-way trade generally leads to (weakly) less
entry in the industry.
With its new approach and prediction, this paper clarifies key interpretation
points in the Melitz (2003) paper. First, it is a decrease in the ideal price index
that drives the bad firms out. It has no effect on the mark-up, but it has negative
effects on the domestic sales of all firms. The (first) selection effect of trade is thus
due to what should be called an increase in product market competition rather than
an increase in labor market competition (as may be understood in Melitz, 2003,
Section 7.2).3 Second, it might be wrongly inferred from Melitz (2003, Section
7.2) and Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007, Sections 1 and 5.1) that, in the
3This explanation is repeated in most Ph.D.-level lecture notes available on the internet (at the
time the present paper is written).
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Melitz model, moving from autarky to two-way trade leads to more entry in the
industry, thereby raising competition on the labor (Melitz) or product (Bernard
et al.) markets and reinforcing the selection effect of trade. In fact, moving from
autarky to two-way trade generally reduces entry in the industry. It does raise
product market competition, but the actual mechanism is that entry by foreign
firms is not compensated by a corresponding reduction in the mass of active firms.
In Section 2, this paper studies the equilibrium in a closed economy. Then,
in Section 3, it studies the equilibrium with costly trade, and compares the latter
equilibrium with the one obtained for the closed-economy case. We finally conclude.
2 Equilibrium in a closed economy
2.1 Setup of the model
A representative consumer maximizes a C.E.S. utility function. The elasticity of
substitution across goods is σ > 1. The aggregate expenditure is R.
To enter the industry, a firm must employ fe > 0 workers during one period.
The firm then draws its productivity parameter ϕ from a common distribution g(ϕ)
with a positive support over (0,∞) and a continuous cumulative distribution G(ϕ).
Labor requirement is given by l = f + q/ϕ, with f identical across firms. Upon
entry, a firm may decide to exit the industry. If it decides to produce, it faces a
probability of death δ in each period.4 There is no time discounting, and there is
monopolistic competition. We restrict our analysis to the stationary equilibria and
discuss only the fundamental forces that bring about the long-run effects of trade.
4With these assumptions, Melitz (2003) builds on Hopenhayn (1992).
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2.2 Individual profits
In autarky, the stationary distribution of firms is truncated at a zero-profit cutoff
ϕ∗a.
5 All firms with ϕ < ϕ∗a would make negative profits if staying in the industry
and thus voluntarily decide to exit. We normalize the wage rate w to one. Optimal
pricing leads to p(ϕ) = σ
(σ−1)ϕ . Following Melitz (2003), let us define ϕ˜(ϕ
∗
a) ≡(∫∞
ϕ∗a
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
) 1
σ−1
, where µ(ϕ) ≡ g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗a) . Conditional on the mass of active
firms Ma and the cutoff productivity level ϕ
∗
a, a firm with productivity ϕ makes
profits given by
pi(ϕ|ϕ∗a,Ma) =
R
σ
(
p(ϕ)
P (ϕ∗a,Ma)
)1−σ
− f,
where P (ϕ∗a,Ma) ≡
(∫∞
ϕ∗a
p(ϕ)1−σMaµ(ϕ)dϕ
) 1
1−σ
=M
1
1−σ
a p(ϕ˜(ϕ∗a)). With free entry,
the net value of entry is zero in equilibrium, and total expenditures are equal to
labor income (R = L). We find
pi(ϕ|ϕ∗a,Ma) =
L
σMa
ϕσ−1
ϕ˜(ϕ∗a)σ−1
− f.
The profit of a firm depends positively on its productivity, and negatively on the
mass of firms supplying goods and on the weighted average productivity of these
firms.
2.3 Determination of the zero-profit cutoff
As a firm’s profit is increasing in its productivity, the truncation point ϕ∗a is in fact
the zero-profit cutoff such that
pi(ϕ∗a|ϕ∗a,Ma) =
L
σ
(
p(ϕ∗a)
P (ϕ∗a,Ma)
)1−σ
− f = 0⇔ L
σMa
ϕ
∗(σ−1)
a
ϕ˜(ϕ∗a)σ−1
− f = 0. (1)
5When some values are specific to the closed-economy equilibrium, we use the subscript a.
5
This condition can be rewritten
f [k(ϕ∗a) + 1] =
L
σMa
(ZPa) (2)
where k(ϕ) ≡
(
ϕ˜(ϕ)
ϕ
)σ−1
− 1. The right-hand side of this equation is decreasing in
Ma, and, as recalled by Melitz (2003), its left-hand side is decreasing in ϕ
∗
a for many
common families of distributions. With such distributions, an increase in Ma leads
to an increase in ϕ∗a: with a small number of firms in the industry, even the low
productivity firms can survive; when firms become more numerous, the productivity
threshold for survival goes up.
2.4 The free-entry condition
For the firms that stay in the industry, the average profit conditional on the mass
of firms Ma and the truncation point ϕ
∗
a is
p¯ia(ϕ
∗
a,Ma) = pi(ϕ˜(ϕ
∗
a)|ϕ∗a,Ma) =
L
σMa
(
ϕ˜(ϕ∗a)
ϕ˜(ϕ∗a)
)σ−1
− f = L
σMa
− f.
Conditional on Ma, the expected profit does not depend on ϕ
∗
a. Intuitively, if the
productivity cutoff goes up, then firms are on average more productive; the increase
in individual profits due to the higher productivity is exactly compensated by the
higher average productivity of the competitors.
With free entry, the expected net value of entry must be equal to zero:
[1−G(ϕ∗a)]
p¯ia
δ
− fe = 0⇔ L
σMa
− f = δfe
1−G(ϕ∗a)
(FEa) (3)
This equation indicates a negative relationship between the mass of active firms Ma
and the productivity cutoff ϕ∗a: when the mass of active firms increases, this lowers
6
the average industry profits; for the free-entry condition to be satisfied, it must be
that firms are more likely to survive, implying that ϕ∗a must decrease.
2.5 Equilibrium in a closed economy
The equilibrium values for Ma and ϕ
∗
a are determined by equations (2) and (3).
Combining the two expressions, we get that the zero-profit cutoff must satisfy
f [1−G(ϕ∗a)]k(ϕ∗a) = δfe. (4)
Figure 1 shows the autarky equilibrium (Ea) and the way it is determined. The
equilibrium exists and is unique (Melitz, 2003, Appendix B.1).
M
ϕ∗
ϕ∗a
Ma
FEa
Ea
ZPa
Figure 1: Determination of the equilibrium cutoff ϕ∗a and mass of active firms Ma.
3 Equilibrium in the open economy
3.1 Costly trade
Following the opening of trade, the world is composed of (n+1) identical countries.
To sell abroad, firms must incur two additional costs: a per-unit iceberg transporta-
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tion cost τ , and a fixed export cost whose amortized per-period portion is fx. The
latter cost is to be incurred for each destination market.
3.2 Individual profits
Optimal pricing for exports leads to a selling price on foreign markets of pX(ϕ) =
τσ
(σ−1)ϕ . With two-way trade, the stationary distribution of firms is truncated at a
zero-profit cutoff ϕ∗t . Let ϕ˜(ϕ
∗
x) be the weighted average productivity level of the
exporting firms when the cutoff for exporting is ϕ∗x. Following Melitz (2003), we
define ϕ˜(ϕ∗x) ≡
(∫∞
ϕ∗x
ϕσ−1pxµ(ϕ)dϕ
) 1
σ−1
, with µ(ϕ) ≡ g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗t ) and px ≡
1−G(ϕ∗x)
1−G(ϕ∗t ) .
With trade, the profit of a firm on its domestic market is
pid(ϕ|ϕ∗t , ϕ∗x,Mt) =
R
σ
(
p(ϕ)
P (ϕ∗t , ϕ∗x,Ma)
)1−σ
− f
⇔ pid(ϕ|ϕ∗t , ϕ∗x,Mt) =
R
σMt
ϕσ−1
ϕ˜(ϕ∗t )σ−1 + pxnτ 1−σϕ˜(ϕ∗x)σ−1
− f.
3.3 Determination of the zero-profit cutoff
As a firm’s profit increases with its own productivity, the truncation point ϕ∗t is the
new zero-profit cutoff. Assuming that the active firms with the lowest productivity
do not export and using R = L, we have
pid(ϕ
∗
t |ϕ∗t , ϕ∗x,Mt) =
L
σ
(
p(ϕ∗t )
P (ϕ∗t , ϕ∗x,Ma)
)1−σ
− f = 0 (5)
⇔ L
σMt
ϕ
∗(σ−1)
t
ϕ˜(ϕ∗t )σ−1 + pxnτ 1−σϕ˜(ϕ∗x)σ−1
− f = 0
Comparing (1) and (5) shows that trade induces a change in ϕ∗ if and only if it
affects the price index, a measure of product market competition.6 As px will be
6Normalizing the nominal wage w to one, the real wage is given by 1/P : a change in the price
index also induces a change in the real wage. But this change in the real wage is due to a change
in the degree of product market competition.
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positive, trade has no effect on ϕ∗ if and only if entry by foreign firms is exactly
compensated by “sufficient” exit.
Using ϕ∗x(ϕ
∗
t ) = τ
(
fx
f
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗t (equation (19) in Melitz, 2003), we get
f [k(ϕ∗t ) + 1] + pxnfx[k(ϕ
∗
x(ϕ
∗
t )) + 1] =
L
σMt
. (ZPt) (6)
The left-hand side of this equation is decreasing in ϕ∗t for many common families of
distributions. Thus, with such distributions, there is a positive relationship between
Mt and ϕ
∗
t . In the (M,ϕ
∗) space, this relationship describes a (ZP ) curve similar
to the one for the autarky case, but shifted upward. In all countries, the most
productive foreign firms enter and make the markets more competitive: this is
the domestic-profit-reducing effect of the opening to two-way trade. As the low
productivity firms do not export, it is harder for them to survive and ϕ∗ tends to
go up.
With a shift of the (ZP ) curve only, we can determine an hypothetical long-
run equilibrium (E ′) with ϕ∗ higher and M lower than in the autarky equilibrium
(Ea). How can we interpret this hypothetical equilibrium E
′? Section 3.5 proves
that, for any given M , imports and exports have effects on the average variable
profit that exactly cancel off each other. Hence, due to the fixed export costs, two-
way trade leads to a decrease in the average profit (for any given mass of firms)
and, as we will see, to a shift of the (FE) curve. The hypothetical equilibrium E ′
therefore indicates the long-run equilibrium that would obtain if the fixed costs led
to a domestic-profit-reducing effect, but not to an average-profit-reducing effect. As
Figure 2 shows, foreign market penetration by the most productive firms induces
exit by the least productive firms and a decrease in the mass of firms. The fixed
9
export costs are here crucial: our analysis is based on the assumption that the least
productive firms decide not to export.
M
ϕ∗
ϕ∗a
Ma
FEa
FEt
Mt
ϕ∗t
Ea
E′
Et
ZPa
ZPt
Figure 2: The impact of trade on the cutoff ϕ∗ and the mass of active firms M .
Even though we are mainly interested in the long-run effect of the opening to
trade, we can get some intuition by considering the short-run effect of an unexpected
shift of the (ZP ) curve. Just before this event, we are still at point Ea. When the
change is announced, the low productivity firms realize that they will not be able
to survive after the opening of trade. They thus exit, which decreases the mass of
active firms.
3.4 Determination of the export cutoff
For an exporting firm, profits on the foreign markets are
npix(ϕ|ϕ∗t , ϕ∗x,Mt) =
nR
σMt
τ 1−σϕσ−1
ϕ˜(ϕ∗t )σ−1 + pxnτ 1−σϕ˜(ϕ∗x)σ−1
− nfx,
As these profits are increasing in ϕ, we must have
npix(ϕ
∗
x|ϕ∗t , ϕ∗x,Mt) =
nR
σMt
τ 1−σϕ∗(σ−1)x
ϕ˜(ϕ∗t )σ−1 + pxnτ 1−σϕ˜(ϕ∗x)σ−1
− nfx = 0
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⇔ f [k(ϕ∗t ) + 1] + pxnfx[k(ϕ∗x(ϕ∗t )) + 1] =
L
σMt
.
This is the same equation as the one defining the zero-profit cutoff. Therefore,
the system of equations that characterizes the open-economy equilibrium, (ZPt and
FEt, with the latter given in Section 3.5), is similar to the one that characterizes
the autarky equilibrium, (ZPa and FEa). The export productivity cutoff is simply
given by ϕ∗x(ϕ
∗
t ) = τ
(
fx
f
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗t .
3.5 The free-entry condition
For surviving firms, the conditional average profit is
p¯it(ϕ
∗
t , ϕ
∗
x,Mt) = pid(ϕ˜(ϕ
∗
t )|ϕ∗t , ϕ∗x,Mt) + pxnpix(ϕ˜(ϕ∗x)|ϕ∗t , ϕ∗x,Mt).
We can find
p¯it(ϕ
∗
t , ϕ
∗
x,Mt) =
L
σMt
− f − pxnfx.
As long as pxnfx > 0, this implies
p¯it(ϕ
∗, ϕ∗x(ϕ
∗),M) < p¯ia(ϕ∗
′
,M),∀(M,ϕ∗, ϕ∗′).
For any givenM , trade liberalization leads to a lower average profit for the surviving
firms: this is the average-profit-reducing effect of two-way trade. The fixed export
costs fx are also crucial here.
This result seemingly stands in stark contrast to the one in Melitz (2003) where
it is shown that, for a given zero-profit cutoff ϕ∗, the average profit of surviving
firms increases with trade. How can we reconcile the two results? Our analysis
implies that the average profit increases after trade liberalization if the drop in the
mass of surviving firms is sufficient; thus Melitz (2003) gets his result because, to
11
keep any given zero-profit cutoff constant, the required drop in the mass of entering
firms (thus in the mass of surviving firms) more than compensates for the new costs
pxnfx.
Using R = L, the free-entry condition is
[1−G(ϕ∗t )]
p¯it
δ
− fe = 0⇔ L
σMt
− f − pxnfx = δfe
1−G(ϕ∗t )
. (FEt) (7)
Equations (3) and (7) imply that the (FE) curve shifts downward. As Figure 2
shows, the shift of the (FE) curve tends to mitigate the increase in ϕ∗.
To gain some intuition here, one can notice that point E ′ cannot describe a
long-run equilibrium. Indeed, for E ′ to be a long-run equilibrium, the mass of firms
entering the industry in each period has to be equal to δM
′
1−G(ϕ′) (where M
′ and ϕ′
are respectively the mass of firms and the productivity cutoff at E ′). With such an
entry, (only) the firms with a productivity ϕ ≥ ϕ′ are able to survive. On the other
hand, the net value of entry is negative, meaning that there should be less entry.
This reduces the mass of active firms, which mitigates the increase in ϕ∗.
3.6 Equilibrium in the open economy
Equations (6) and (7) determine the equilibrium values of Mt and ϕ
∗
t , represented
by Et in Figure 2. The zero-profit cutoff must satisfy
f [1−G(ϕ∗t )]k(ϕ∗t ) + nfx[1−G(ϕ∗x(ϕ∗t ))]k(ϕ∗x(ϕ∗t )) = δfe. (8)
The equilibrium exists and is unique (Melitz, 2003, Appendix C.2). Furthermore,
equations (4) and (8) and Melitz (2003, Appendix B.1) imply ϕ∗t > ϕ
∗
a.
Furthermore, the mass of entering firms, δM
1−G(ϕ∗) , is lower in the equilibrium of
the open economy than in the one of the closed economy. Indeed, the free-entry
12
conditions (3) and (7) imply
Ma
1−G(ϕ∗a)
=
L
σ
1
δfe + f [1−G(ϕ∗a)]
;
Mt
1−G(ϕ∗t )
=
L
σ
1
δfe + f [1−G(ϕ∗t )] + nfx[1−G(ϕ∗x)].
There is less entry with trade if
f [1−G(ϕ∗a)] ≤ f [1−G(ϕ∗t )] + nfx[1−G(ϕ∗x)].
But equations (4) and (8) imply together
f [1−G(ϕ∗a)]k(ϕ∗a) = f [1−G(ϕ∗t )]k(ϕ∗t ) + nfx[1−G(ϕ∗x)]k(ϕ∗x)
⇔ f [1−G(ϕ∗a)] = f [1−G(ϕ∗t )]
k(ϕ∗t )
k(ϕ∗a)
+ nfx[1−G(ϕ∗x)]
k(ϕ∗x)
k(ϕ∗a)
.
As we focus on equilibria with ϕ∗a < ϕ
∗
t < ϕ
∗
x and as k(ϕ) is decreasing for the families
of distributions mentioned in Melitz (2003), we get that, in the trading equilibrium,
not only the mass of surviving firms is lower (Mt < Ma, as Figure 2 shows),
7 but the
mass of entering firms is also lower. Generally, trade does not prompt entry.8 This
result is important in that it contradicts the intuition that moving from autarky
to two-way trade raises the value of entry (because exporting opportunities are
7The proof that Mt < Ma is very similar to the one in Melitz (2003). The free-entry conditions
and ϕ∗t > ϕ
∗
a imply together p¯it > p¯ia. The average profit increases after the opening of trade
because the total decrease in M more than compensates for the payment of the fixed export
costs. From the equilibrium values of p¯it and p¯ia, we find Mt = L/[σ(p¯it + f + pxnfx)] and Ma =
L/[σ(p¯ia + f)]. This leads to Mt < Ma.
8This result holds true in the case with homogeneous labor, as studied here. Introducing
heterogeneity in factor endowments and factor intensities in Melitz’s (2003) model, Bernard et al.
(2007) show that trade might lead to more entry in the comparative advantage industries. In their
numerical application, the total mass of entering firms remains constant when going from autarky
to costly trade. This is so because the authors use a Pareto distribution for productivity: with
this distribution, k(ϕ) does not vary with ϕ.
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created), thus the mass of firms entering the industry. For instance, it might be
wrongly inferred from Melitz (2003, Section 7.2) and Bernard et al. (2007, Sections
1 and 5.1) that such an increase in the number of entrants contributes to an increase
in competition on the labor (Melitz) or product (Bernard et al.) markets and thus
to the selection effect of trade. As we have just proved, moving from autarky to
two-way trade in the Melitz (2003) model generally reduces entry in the industry.
It does raise product market competition, but the actual mechanism is that entry
by foreign firms is not compensated by a “sufficient” reduction in the mass of active
firms.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the influential model of international trade with heterogeneous
firms introduced by Melitz (2003). As the original work, our paper focuses on the
effect of moving from autarky to two-way trade.
We study the effect of this trade liberalization with an intuitive, two-stage ap-
proach. Moving from autarky to costly trade, firms located in any country can
export, but only if they pay a fixed export cost. This has two partial effects: a
domestic-profit-reducing effect and an average-profit-reducing effect. Overall, mov-
ing from autarky to two-way trade raises product market competition (i.e. leads to
a lower price index): the reduction in the mass of active firms is not sufficient to
compensate for foreign market penetration by the most productive firms. This is
crucial because this is what drives the bad firms out of the industry.
This increase in the degree of product market competition is not at center stage
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in the now standard approach proposed by Melitz. The problem with this standard
approach is that it might induce a flawed reasoning. Indeed, starting from the fact
that competition by foreign firms (in a model with imports only) is not sufficient to
generate the selection effect of trade, one could conclude from Melitz (2003, Section
7.2) that it is not an increase in product market competition that drives the bad
firms out, but rather an increase in labor market competition. As we have seen,
this is inaccurate. Still with the standard approach, one might conclude that, due
to the introduction of export opportunities, moving from autarky to two-way trade
raises entry in the industry, which reinforces the selection effect of trade (through
an increase in competition on the labor or product markets). We instead provide
the new prediction that moving from autarky to two-way trade generally leads to
less entry in the industry.
We hope that the intuitive approach presented in this paper clarifies those key
interpretation issues in the important Melitz (2003) paper.
15
5 References
Bernard, A.B., S. Redding, and P.K. Schott, 2007, “Comparative Advantage and
Heterogeneous Firms,” Review of Economic Studies, 74, 31–66.
Hopenhayn, H., 1992, “Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilib-
rium,” Econometrica, 60, 1127–1150.
Krugman, P.R., 1980, “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pat-
tern of Trade,” American Economic Review, 70, 950–959.
Melitz, M.J., 2002, “The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and
Aggregate Industry Productivity,” NBER, working paper 8881.
Melitz, M.J., 2003, “The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and
Aggregate Industry Productivity,” Econometrica, 71, 1695–1725.
Melitz, M.J., and G.I. Ottaviano, 2008, “Market Size, Trade, and Productivity,”
Review of Economic Studies, 75, 295–316.
16
ESSEC  
 
CENTRE   
DE RECHERCHE 
 
 
LISTE DES DOCUMENTS DE RECHERCHE DU CENTRE DE RECHERCHE DE L’ESSEC 
 (Pour se procurer ces documents, s’adresser au CENTRE DE RECHERCHE DE L’ESSEC) 
 
  LISTE OF ESSEC RESEARCH CENTER WORKING PAPERS 
 (Contact the ESSEC RESEARCH CENTER for information on how to obtain copies of these papers) 
 
RESEARCH.CENTER@ESSEC.FR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 
 
04001 BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 
 Excessive Liability Dollarization in a Simple Signaling Model 
 
04002 ALFANDARI Laurent 
 Choice Rules Size Constraints for Multiple Criteria Decision Making 
 
04003 BOURGUIGNON Annick, JENKINS Alan 
 Management Accounting Change and the Construction of Coherence in Organisations: a Case Study 
 
04004 CHARLETY Patricia, FAGART Marie-Cécile, SOUAM Saïd 
Real Market Concentration through Partial Acquisitions 
 
04005 CHOFFRAY Jean-Marie 
La révolution Internet 
 
04006 BARONI Michel, BARTHELEMY Fabrice, MOKRANE Mahdi 
The Paris Residential Market: Driving Factors and Market Behaviour 1973-2001 
 
04007 BARONI Michel, BARTHELEMY Fabrice, MOKRANE Mahdi 
Physical Real Estate: A Paris Repeat Sales Residential Index 
 
04008 BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 
The Information Limit to Honest Managerial Behavior 
 
04009 BIZET Bernard 
Public Property Privatization in France 
 
04010 BIZET Bernard 
Real Estate Taxation and Local Tax Policies in France 
 
04011 CONTENSOU François 
Legal Profit-Sharing: Shifting the Tax Burden in a Dual Economy 
 
04012 CHAU Minh, CONTENSOU François 
Profit-Sharing as Tax Saving and Incentive Device 
 
04013 REZZOUK Med 
Cartels globaux, riposte américaine. L’ère Empagran ? 
 
 
2005 
 
05001 VRANCEANU Radu 
The Ethical Dimension of Economic Choices 
 
05002 BARONI Michel, BARTHELEMY Fabrice, MOKRANE Mahdi 
A PCA Factor Repeat Sales Index (1973-2001) to Forecast Apartment Prices in Paris (France) 
 
05003 ALFANDARI Laurent 
Improved Approximation of the General Soft-Capacitated Facility Location Problem 
 
05004 JENKINS Alan 
Performance Appraisal Research: A Critical Review of Work on “the Social Context and Politics of 
Appraisal” 
 
05005 BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 
Socially Efficient Managerial Dishonesty 
 
05006 BOARI Mircea 
Biology & Political Science. Foundational Issues of Political Biology 
 
05007 BIBARD Laurent 
Biologie et politique 
 
05008 BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 
Le financement public du secteur de la défense, une source d'inefficacité ? 
 
 
 
2006 
 
06001 CAZAVAN-JENY Anne, JEANJEAN Thomas 
Levels of Voluntary Disclosure in IPO prospectuses: An Empirical Analysis 
 
06002 BARONI Michel, BARTHELEMY Fabrice, MOKRANE Mahdi 
Monte Carlo Simulations versus DCF in Real Estate Portfolio Valuation 
 
06003 BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 
Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools Tale 
 
06004 FOURCANS André, VRANCEANU Radu 
Is the ECB so Special? A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis 
 
06005 NAIDITCH Claire, VRANCEANU Radu 
Transferts des migrants et offre de travail dans un modèle de signalisation 
 
06006 MOTTIS Nicolas 
Bologna: Far from a Model, Just a Process for a While… 
 
06007 LAMBERT Brice 
Ambiance Factors, Emotions and Web User Behavior: A Model Integrating and Affective and Symbolical 
Approach 
 
06008 BATISTA Catia, POTIN Jacques 
Stages of Diversification and Capital Accumulation in an Heckscher-Ohlin World, 1975-1995 
 
06009 TARONDEAU Jean-Claude 
Strategy and Organization Improving Organizational Learning 
 
06010 TIXIER Daniel 
Teaching Management of Market Driven Business Units  Using Internet Based Business Games 
 
06011 COEURDACIER Nicolas 
Do Trade Costs in Goods Market Lead to Home Bias in Equities? 
 
06012 AVIAT Antonin, COEURDACIER Nicolas 
The Geography of Trade in Goods and Asset Holdings 
 
06013 COEURDACIER Nicolas, GUIBAUD Stéphane 
International Portfolio Diversification Is Better Than You Think 
 
06014 COEURDACIER Nicolas, GUIBAUD Stéphane 
A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Imperfectly Integrated Financial Markets 
 
06015 DUAN Jin-Chuan, FULOP Andras 
Estimating the Structural Credit Risk Model When Equity Prices Are Contaminated by Trading Noises 
 
06016 FULOP Andras 
Feedback Effects of Rating Downgrades 
 
06017 LESCOURRET Laurence, ROBERT Christian Y. 
Preferencing, Internalization and Inventory Position 
 
06018 BOURGUIGNON Annick, SAULPIC Olivier, ZARLOWSKI Philippe 
Management Accounting Change in the Public Sector: A French Case Study and a New Institutionalist 
Perspective 
 
06019 de BEAUFORT Viviane 
One Share – One Vote, le nouveau Saint Graal ? 
 
06020 COEURDACIER Nicolas, MARTIN Philippe 
The Geography of Asset Trade and the Euro: Insiders and Outsiders 
 
06021 BESANCENOT Damien, HUYNH Kim, VRANCEANU Radu 
The "Read or Write" Dilemma in Academic Production: A European Perspective 
 
 
2007 
 
07001 NAIDITCH Claire, VRANCEANU Radu 
International Remittances and Residents' Labour Supply in a Signaling Model 
 
07002 VIENS G., LEVESQUE K., CHAHWAKILIAN P., EL HASNAOUI A., GAUDILLAT A., NICOL G., 
CROUZIER C. 
Évolution comparée de la consommation de médicaments dans 5 pays européens entre 2000 et 2004 : 
analyse de 7 classes pharmaco-thérapeutiques 
 
07003 de BEAUFORT Viviane 
La création d'entreprise au féminin dans le monde occidental 
 
07004 BOARI Mircea 
Rationalizing the Irrational. The Principle of Relative Maximization from Sociobiology to Economics and 
Its Implications for Ethics 
 
07005 BIBARD Laurent 
Sexualités et mondialisation 
 
07006 VRANCEANU Radu 
The Moral Layer of Contemporary Economics: A Virtue Ethics Perspective 
 
07007 LORINO Philippe 
Stylistic Creativity in the Utilization of Management Tools 
 
07008 BARONI Michel, BARTHELEMY Fabrice, MOKRANE Mahdi 
Optimal Holding Period for a Real Estate Portfolio 
 
07009 de BEAUFORT Viviane 
One Share - One Vote, the New Holy Graal? 
 
07010 DEMEESTERE René 
L'analyse des coûts : public ou privé ? 
 
07011 TIXIER Maud 
Appreciation of the Sustainability of the Tourism Industry in Cyprus 
 
07012 LORINO Philippe 
Competence-based Competence Management: a Pragmatic and Interpretive Approach. The Case of a 
Telecommunications Company 
 
07013 LORINO Philippe 
Process Based Management and the Central Role of Dialogical Collective Activity in Organizational 
Learning. The Case of Work Safety in the Building Industry 
 
07014 LORINO Philippe 
The Instrumental Genesis of Collective Activity. The Case of an ERP Implementation in a Large 
Electricity Producer 
 
07015 LORINO Philippe, GEHRKE Ingmar 
Coupling Performance Measurement and Collective Activity: The Semiotic Function of Management 
Systems. A Case Study 
 
07016 SALLEZ Alain 
Urbaphobie et désir d'urbain, au péril de la ville 
 
07017 de CARLO Laurence 
The Classroom as a Potential Space - Teaching Negotiation through Paradox 
 
07019 ESPOSITO VINZI Vincenzo 
Capturing and Treating Unobserved Heterogeneity by Response Based Segmentation in PLS Path 
Modeling. A Comparison of Alternative Methods by Computational Experiments 
 
07020 CHEVILLON Guillaume, Christine RIFFLART  
 Physical Market Determinants of the Price of Crude Oil and the Market Premium 
 
07021 CHEVILLON Guillaume 
 Inference in the Presence of Stochastic and Deterministic Trends 
 
07023 COLSON Aurélien 
 The Ambassador, between Light and Shade. The Emergence of Secrecy as the Norm of International 
Negotiation 
 
07024 GOMEZ Marie-Léandre 
 A Bourdieusian Perspective on Strategizing 
 
07025 BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 
 Multiple Equilibria in a Firing Game with Impartial Justice 
 
07026 BARONI Michel, BARTHELEMY Fabrice, MOKRANE Madhi 
 Is It Possible to Construct Derivatives for the Paris Residential Market? 
 
 
2008 
 
08001     BATISTA Catia, POTIN Jacques 
 International Specialization and the Return to Capital, 1976-2000 
 
08002 BESANCENOT Damien, FARIA Joan Ricardo, VRANCEANU Radu 
 Why Business Schools do so much Research: a Signaling Explanation 
  
08003 De BEAUFORT Viviane 
 D’un effet vertueux de l’art. 116 de la loi NRE en matière de RSE ? La problématique est posée à 
échelle de l’Union européenne 
 
08004 MATHE Hervé 
 Greater Space means more Service: Leveraging the Innovative Power of Architecture and Design 
 
08005 MATHE Hervé 
 Leading in Service Innovation: Three perspectives on Service Value delivery in a European Context 
08006 ROMANIUK Katarzyna, VRANCEANU Radu 
 Asset Prices and Asymmetries in the Fed’s Interest Rate Rule: A Financial Approach 
 
08007 MOTTIS Nicolas, WALTON Peter 
 Measuring Research Output across Borders - A Comment 
 
08008 NAPPI-CHOULET Ingrid, MAURY Tristan-Pierre 
 A Spatiotemporal Autoregressive Price index for the Paris Office Property Market 
 
08009 METIU Anca, OBODARU Otilia 
 Women’s professional Identity Formation in the Free/Open Source Software Community   
 
08010 SIBIEUDE Thierry, VIDAL Rodolphe 
 Le programme «  Une grande école : pourquoi pas moi ? ® ». D’une action de responsabilité soc_iétale 
de l’ESSEC à la responsabilité sociétale des grandes écoles françaises 
 
08011 SIBIEUDE Thierry, VIDAL Rodolphe 
 Enjeux et perspectives du sociétariat des groupes mutualistes complexes face aux stratégies de 
développement à l’échelle groupe : quelques enseignements du cas du groupeMACIF 
  
08012 FOURCANS André, VRANCEANU Radu 
 Money in the Inflation Equation: the Euro Area Evidence 
 
08013 CAZAVAN-JENY Anne, JEANJEAN Thomas 
 Supply and Demand for European Accounting Research. Evidence from EAA Congresses 
 
08014 FAYARD Anne-Laure,  METIU Anca  
 Beyond Orality and Literacy: Letters and Organizational Communication 
 
08015 CAZAVAN-JENY Anne, MISSONIER-PIERA Franck, MARGAINE J. 
 CEO Compensations in a Stakeholders’ Regime: An Empirical Investigation With French Listed 
Companies 
 
08016 METIU Anca, FAYARD Anne-Laure 
 Letters and Scientific Communities 
 
08017 BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 
 Migratory Policy in Developing Countries: How to Bring Best People Back? 
 
08018 BESANCENOT Damien, VRANCEANU Radu 
 Financial Distress and Bank’s Communication Policy in Crisis Time 
 
08019 AGID Philippe, TARONDEAU Jean-Claude 
 Les performances des maisons d’Opéra : une explication statistique 
 
 
 
 
